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The Modigliani-Miller Theorem on the irrelevance of corpo-
rate capital structure is perhaps the best-known result in modern
finance. Simply put, the theorem states that, under certain as-
sumptions, the market value of a firm is independent of its capital
structure. Under the stylized assumptions of the theorem, substi-
tuting equity for debt or adding layers of debt to the capital struc-
ture of a firm, as occurred during much of the 1980s, has no affect
on the firm's value.1 The theorem applies not only to the mix of
debt and equity, but also to the mix of debt itself, such as between
secured and unsecured or senior and subordinated debt.
Understanding existing patterns of debt and equity therefore
begins with the Modigliani-Miller Theorem. One must identify
which of the theorem's assumptions do not hold and explain why
relaxing them leads to the patterns of debt and equity that cur-
rently exist. Much scholarship has examined the assumption that
changes in capital structure do not affect the way in which a firm
uses its assets.3 There is little reason to think that this assumption
is true. It is now well-understood that equityholders may choose
different projects if debt is present than they would otherwise:
equityholders enjoy all of the benefits of successful projects but
share the losses from unsuccessful ventures with creditors.
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Over the last decade, a number of scholars have tried to ex-
tend this analysis to the institution of secured credit. They have
asked whether the desirability of giving decisionmaking power to
the equityholders, and the resulting need of creditors to ensure
that the equityholders do not abuse this power explains why some
creditors take a security interest while others do not. These schol-
ars have focused on the manner in which secured credit might en-
hance the ability of creditors to monitor debtor misbehavior. The
current posture of this literature, however, offers only limited sup-
port for the view that secured credit matters in the monitoring of
debtor misbehavior.4
The focus of this scholarship, limited to the effects of secured
credit on debtor misbehavior, has been too narrow. Just as the
debtor is capable of misbehaving, so too are the creditors. A credi-
tor may seize assets and sell them piecemeal, even if a sole owner
would keep the assets together. If no single creditor enjoyed prior-
ity over another, each creditor might have an incentive to spend
resources monitoring both the debtor and the other creditors to
ensure that it was paid if the debtor failed. Whether secured credit
can be a device that minimizes, or even eliminates, creditor misbe-
havior is a question that the literature has neglected completely.
In this Article, I set forth a simple game-theoretic model to
analyze this question. The formal model exposes weaknesses in the
existing literature and suggests that secured credit probably does
not respond to debtor misbehavior. More importantly, I suggest
that secured credit is a sensible response to the problem of creditor
misbehavior. In doing so, I offer a new view of perhaps the central
premise of recent bankruptcy scholarship. The same scholars who
have not seen a link between secured credit and creditor misbehav-
ior have nevertheless argued that bankruptcy law exists primarily
to overcome the problems that arise when too many creditors
chase too few assets.5 By failing to see that secured credit is a re-
Compare Thomas H. Jackson and Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Pri-
orities Among Creditors, 88 Yale L J 1143, 1149-61 (1979); Saul Levmore, Monitors and
Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 Yale L J 49, 55-59 (1982), with
Schwartz, 37 Vand L Rev at 1057-59 (cited in note 2). See also Douglas G. Baird, Property
Rights, Priority Rights, and Ostensible Ownership: The Deep Structure of Article 9, in
Peter F. Coogan, et al, 1 Bender's Uniform Commercial Code Service: Secured Transac-
tions Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 1.06 (Matthew Bender, 1991).
' Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'
Bargain, 91 Yale L J 857 (1982); Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate
Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Ade-
quate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U Chi L Rev 97 (1984); Thomas
H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 3 (Harvard, 1986). But compare
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sponse to creditor misbehavior, these scholars misunderstand the
institution of secured credit and, more importantly, structure their
analysis of bankruptcy law upon an unsound premise.
These scholars assume that creditors who face a troubled
debtor face a common pool problem, and that bankruptcy law ex-
ists to overcome it. The common pool problem, however, is typi-
cally within the domain of property law. It arises among strangers
who have had no established relationships with each other or with
any common third party. The setting is an English pasture in the
fifteenth century,7 a Texas oil field at the turn of the century8 or a
fishery in Malaysia today.9 The common pool problem arises in
these situations from an overlapping distribution of rights where
acquisition or capture means an absolute priority in ownership.
When each person has the same right to graze, drill or fish and no
one has the right to exclude the others, the dominant strategy for
each person is to graze, drill, or fish, without regard to the common
interest in assuring that the resource is put to its best use.
Those who enjoy these rights to a common resource acquire
them independently. There are no prior dealings among them. By
contrast, the relationships among the debtor and its creditors are
largely contractual. The parties themselves can structure their re-
lationships with each other to minimize the common pool problem.
James W. Bowers, Whither What Hits the Fan?: Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Law and the
Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution, 26 Ga L Rev 27 (1991) (noting possible rela-
tionship between secured transactions and bankruptcy theory).
I This scholarship also suffers from a more basic defect. It begins the inquiry in the
wrong place. It starts with the notion that the underlying debt-collection rules are fixed and
that bankruptcy law should be designed around them. An issue I expect to pursue in further
research is whether first accepting state law baselines and then asking how to best respect
those baselines in a collective bankruptcy proceeding fundamentally misconceives the ap-
propriate nature of the inquiry. We might be better served by focusing directly on the form
of a set of optimal insolvency rules. In particular, the current bankruptcy law is now
designed to solve the common pool problem, but that problem arises only because levying
on assets and establishing priority to those assets are treated as one. If they were sepa-
rated-if seizing assets left unchanged the unsecured creditor's right to only a pro rata share
of the assets if the debtor were insolvent at the time of seizure-the traditional common
pool problems would be minimized, if not completely eliminated. We need to weigh carefully
the advantages and disadvantages of linking seizure and priority. By looking only at bank-
ruptcy law with debt-collection rules as a given, we have ignored these fundamental
questions.
See J.A. Yelling, Common Field and Enclosure in England 1450-1850 (Macmillan,
1977).
See Gary D. Libecap and Steven N. Wiggins, Contractual Responses to the Common
Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 74 Am Econ Rev 87 (1984).
9 See E.N. Anderson, Jr., A Malaysian Tragedy of the Commons, in Bonnie J. McCay
and James M. Acheson, eds, The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of
Communal Resources 327 (Arizona, 1987).
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Many firms have both secured and unsecured creditors; others
grant no secured debt but still have senior and subordinated un-
secured creditors. By the initial allocation of priority rights, many
firms can avoid the common pool problem altogether. For example,
if the firm would owe a single secured creditor more than the firm
would be worth if it failed, no common pool problem would arise.
The debtor will also seek ways to minimize the harms of the
common pool. The creditors can anticipate the common pool prob-
lem and will therefore charge interest rates to cover the antici-
pated losses that will result. Because the debtor bears these inter-
est costs directly, it will internalize the cost of the common pool
and will therefore search for mechanisms to minimize the costs.
Security interests and other priority devices play this role.
To put the point in different terms, the common pool problem
is a multi-party version of the Prisoner's Dilemma.10 Actions that
are in the self-interest of the individual shepherd, oil driller, fisher,
or prisoner run contrary to the interests of the group. If one's focus
is too narrow, however, one may identify a situation as a prisoner's
dilemma when it is instead a small decisionmaking problem em-
bedded in a much larger one. Although the self-interested acts of
the individual in such a situation may appear harmful to the group
when seen in the context of the smaller problem, they may actually
correspond to the interests of the group when seen in the context
of the larger problem." The legal literature reflects this insight in
the particular case of repeated play of the prisoner's dilemma,
where it is well-known that socially efficient results may be ob-
tained even while allowing for independent decisionmaking.2 How-
ever, the broader range of ways in which embedding can occur has
'0 Jackson, Logic at 10 (cited in note 5). For a recent history of the Prisoner's Dilemma,
see William Poundstone, Prisoner's Dilemma (Doubleday, 1992).
" A similar point is made in George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in Com-
parative Politics 7 (California, 1990).
12 See, for example, Alan 0. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International
Commercial Relations: The Limited Law of § 301 (forthcoming Law and Public Policy in
International Business, 1992); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 Colum L Rev
277, 341-43 (1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a
Multi-Player Game, 78 Georgetown L J 1495, 1542-44 (1990); John K. Setear, The Barrister
and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse,
69 BU L Rev 569, 594-601 (1989); Henry N. Butler and Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of
Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 Cornell L Rev 677, 692 n 65 (1988); Roberta
Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 Stan L Rev 923, 928 n 12 (1984). This
literature draws upon the experimental work in Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Coopera-
tion (Basic/Harper Collins, 1984), and the theoretical work in Drew Fudenberg and Eric
Maskin, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete In-
formation, 54 Econometrica 533 (1986).
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yet to receive substantial attention. This Article examines a partic-
ular version of an embedded game, while leaving to another day a
more general discussion of embedded games and legal rules.
This Article is divided into four sections. Section I sets out a
brief road map to the worlds of secured and prioritized credit. Se-
curity interests and priority rights serve many purposes; I focus on
situations in which the value of the assets in a firm depends on
how the firm exercises control over them. Section II explores the
extent to which contracts can address problems of misbehavior and
argues that we need more powerful devices to control misbehavior
effectively. Creditors must often monitor debtor misbehavior; with
creditor misbehavior on the other hand, we need devices that stop
monitoring. In each case, we must address the important conse-
quences of monitoring externalities. Section III considers three for-
mal models of these situations: a debtor-misbehavior model; a
common pool (or creditor-misbehavior) model; and a combined
debtor- and creditor-misbehavior model. In each of the three cases,
I set out a simple two-person model and apply a standard game-
theoretic solution concept to suggest how individual decisionmak-
ing can be coordinated without writing full-blown contracts among
the various parties. Section IV concludes the Article.
I. THE WORLD OF SECURED AND PRIORITIZED CREDIT
Before I focus specifically on security interests in personal
property of the limited-liability firm, I briefly examine the role
that security interests play in the economy generally. Secured
transactions may range from a $10 loan at the local pawnshop se-
- cured by a pledge of a ring, to the mortgage on my house, to multi-
billion dollar loans secured by all of a company's assets. In the
United States, real property lending constitutes the largest part of
the secured transactions market. At the end of 1990, there was ap-
proximately $8.6 trillion outstanding in non-governmental debt.13
Real property mortgage debt constituted approximately $3.85 tril-
lion of that amount, or more than forty-five percent of the non-
governmental debt. No other single category of debt looms so large
in the private economy.14
Although secured lending on real estate dwarfs other forms of
secured or prioritized lending, these other forms of lending are far
" See Summary of Credit Market Debt Outstanding, 77 Federal Reserve Bulletin A43,
Table 1.59 (Oct 1991).
" Id.
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from insubstantial. In the United States, for instance, automobile
financing in 1990 represented another $285 billion of debt, most of
which was secured."" The asset-based finance industry lent another
$96 billion.16 This category covers privately-held loans to busi-
nesses by banks, financing companies and others for which the pri-
mary collateral is the personal property assets of the business. Cor-
porate bonds and notes, in contrast, are often publicly-held. These
instruments are generally unsecured, though some categories, such
as utility bonds and equipment trust certificates, routinely involve
security. These issues are sufficiently common that approximately
eighteen percent of the new corporate issues over the three-year
period 1988-1990 involved secured credit.'7 During that same pe-
riod, another fifteen percent of the new corporate issues created
prioritized credit. Senior debentures, senior notes, and even senior
subordinated notes were common.'8
Given such a diverse factual pattern, we would be surprised if
secured credit played the same role in all transactions. It almost
surely does not. There are at least five different roles security in-
terests can play. First, security interests can minimize the costs of
making and collecting loans. Second, they can reduce the need to
monitor in situations where the property's value is largely indepen-
dent of how it is managed. Third, security interests can make as-
sets available to creditors on default that debtors would otherwise
shield from them. Fourth, through a security interest, a debtor can
commit to a creditor that the debtor will not later create
debt-consensually or nonconsensually-that is superior to or on
par with preexisting debt. Finally, security interests-and priority
devices more broadly-can significantly affect the manner in which
parties exercise control over the monitoring of assets. I will con-
sider this fifth role of security interests in detail in Section II.
Before turning to the monitoring and control functions of security
interests, however, I consider the first four roles in turn.
Pawnbroking is among the most common of secured transac-
tions. More than thirty-five million such loans are made each
year.' 9 The pawnbroker usually lends less than $100, often sub-
"5 See Consumer Installment Credit, 77 Federal Reserve Bulletin A38, Table 1.55 (Oct
1991).
16 See Frank J. Donahue, Getting Back to Basics, 48 The Secured Lender 36, 39 (Jan/
Feb 1992).
'7 Compiled from issues of Corporate Financing Week.
18 Id.
19 Ellen Braitman, As Pawnshops Thrive, Banks Steer Clear, Am Banker 1 (Nov 15,
1991).
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stantially less. Security interests help minimize transactions costs
for these loans: detailed investigations into the borrower's net
worth would cost more than the amount borrowed. The best evi-
dence a borrower can give of his or her ability to pay is to deliver
to the pawnbroker an asset with a value that exceeds the size of
the loan. This security interest is not foolproof, as there could be a
thief in the borrower's chain of title. However, for most personal
property, possession is still the best evidence of ownership. The
pledge in pawnbroking also minimizes collection costs. The pawn-
broker need not chase down the defaulting borrower, but instead
can pay off the loan by selling the asset. Again, without security,
collection costs would loom large relative to the amount lent. In
short, the security interest minimizes the costs of making and col-
lecting these small loans.
Real estate mortgages are different. Detailed investigations of
financial responsibility are standard. The costs of drafting and re-
cording a mortgage increase, rather than decrease, the costs of
making the loan. Although drafting and recording the mortgage
may decrease the costs of collecting in the event of a default, these
costs are small relative to the size of the loan itself. Given the in-
creased expense in creating real estate mortgages and the relatively
modest reduction in collection costs they produce, real estate mort-
gages cannot readily be understood as devices for minimizing
transaction costs. Instead, security interests in real estate reduce
needless monitoring of the debtor's behavior. My mortgage lender
has yet to appear at my house to see if I have fixed the leaky fau-
cet in the kitchen. Indeed, if all goes well, my lender does little
more than collect checks and remind me occasionally of my duty to
keep my house insured. While there is little doubt that real estate
values change dramatically over time-this fact accounts for many
"Chapter 20" bankruptcies 2 -- almost all of the variation affects
the real estate market as a whole, and little of it is idiosyncratic.
Homeowners could reduce value by destroying their homes, but al-
most surely will not do so. They also lack any good means of risk-
ing the value of the house in exchange for some large potential
upside.
Consequently, a mortgage lender need only worry that the
borrower will try to make off with the value of the house by selling
it, pocketing the cash, and disappearing. A security interest on the
" The "Chapter 20" bankruptcy-a Chapter 7 petition followed quickly by a Chapter
13 petition-is a recent phenomenon. A relatively straightforward example of these cases
can be found in Johnson v Home State Bank, 111 S Ct 2150 (1991).
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house effectively prevents this. The security interest follows the
house into the new owner's hands. Note the difference in the posi-
tions of the unsecured creditor and the secured creditor. If the bor-
rower sells the house for its market value, the unsecured creditor
has no right against the house in the new owner's hands. 1 The
secured creditor's rights, however, continue in full as if the bor-
rower still owned the house.
The third role played by security interests relates to state and
federal exemption laws for the assets of individuals. Although most
people understand that security interests affect the relative rights
of the creditors, many overlook the fact that security interests also
directly affect rights between the debtor and the creditor. Section
522 of the Bankruptcy Code, for instance, sets forth a set of federal
exemptions. A state can supplement this scheme if it so chooses or
can displace it entirely. Most states have chosen to create their
own exemptions, some of which are extremely favorable to debt-
ors.22 Federal law draws the rather mysterious line of preventing
the debtor from simply waiving these exemptions as against un-
secured creditors,23 but allowing the debtor to grant an enforceable
security interest in many of the otherwise exempt assets. Security
interests make property available to creditors on default that
would otherwise be denied to them.24
The legal rules surrounding a mechanism will, in part, deter-
mine the role it plays. In the context of security interests, the legal
regime allows a debtor to assure a creditor that it will not later
create debt that is superior to or on par with preexisting debt. To
put the point differently, the current legal system will not gener-
ally enforce simple negative pledge clauses or promises of priority.
Without more, an unsecured creditor would suffer the risk that
subsequent debt will dilute the value of earlier debt. In the ab-
sence of such a commitment, unsecured creditors would have to
forecast the extent of later debt and charge interest based on that
21 Under the uniform fraudulent conveyance laws, payment of fair consideration is an
absolute defense, so long as the purchaser is without knowledge of the fraud. See Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 9, reprinted in 7A Uniform Laws Annotated 577-78 (West,
1985); Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act § 8, reprinted in id at 662-63.
22 Florida and Texas are well-known in this regard.
" See 11 USC § 522(e) (1988 & Supp 1990); FTC Credit Practices, 16 CFR 444.2(2)
(1984).
24 There are limits on the extent to which this can occur. Section 522(f)(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code allows the debtor to avoid a broad category of nonpossessory, nonpurchase
money liens. Also, the taking of such a lien constitutes an unfair practice under 16 CFR §
444.2. See also Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies,
89 Colum L Rev 730, 747 (1989).
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forecast. Prior unsecured lenders would also face the risk of dilu-
tion through subsequent nonconsensual debt. Like limited liability,
security interests play an important role in limiting the extent to
which later nonconsensual creditors can share in assets intended to
be set aside for particular creditors.
The answer to the question, "Why secured credit here?", thus
lies in part with the role assigned to secured credit under current
law. As we have seen, current law attaches attributes to the secur-
ity interest, such as its special status as against third-party pur-
chasers, its use as a means of receiving rights against otherwise ex-
empt assets, and its use as a commitment device. But another role
for secured credit remains: secured credit, as well as prioritized
credit more generally, can affect the manner in which parties exer-
cise control over the monitoring of assets. In the balance of this
Article, I consider situations in which the value of the firm's assets
depends on how the firm exercises control over them.
II. MONITORING AND CONTRACTS
How assets are managed and their resulting value reflects the
returns that accrue to the group exercising control over the assets.
One sees this most often in firms that have both debt and equity.
The interests of shareholders as a group diverge from those of
creditors as a group. When shareholders have creditors, they em-
brace investment policies that they would reject if they did not
have creditors. Four types of such possible misbehavior by share-
holders are commonly identified: 25 (i) flat-out withdrawals of assets
by shareholders; (ii) increased risk with internal funds (or asset
substitutions) ;26 (iii) increased risk through new funds and new
projects;27 and (iv) foregoing valuable investment opportunities. 8
A. Monitoring, Solvency, and the Limits of Contracts
Creditors can reduce the risk of debtor misbehavior either by
monitoring the debtor's behavior or by acquiring certain rights
11 George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of Imperfect Information, 21 J
Legal Stud 225, 234 (1992).
26 See, for example, Clifford W. Smith, Jr. and Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy, Secured
Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure: Comment, 34 J Fin 247, 250 (1979); Jackson and
Kronman, 88 Yale L J at 1149-50 (cited in note 4); Levmore, 92 Yale L J at 51-52 (cited in
note 4).
27 See, for example, Eugene F. Fama and Merton H. Miller, The Theory of Finance
150-52 (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18
J Legal Stud 209, 228-30 (1989).
"' See Triantis, 21 J Legal Stud at 230 (cited in note 25).
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against the debtor at the outset. These are distinct approaches. In-
deed, given sufficient rights in the debt contract, the amount of
costly monitoring that takes place may go down. "Me-first" cove-
nants,29 the related automatic first priority position 0 and secured
credit itself can be understood as attempts to reduce debtor misbe-
havior through contracts. These approaches work best when the
debtor must go outside the firm to raise new funds for a risky and
undesirable project. If the first lender takes a security interest in
all of the assets of the debtor, the debtor is legally barred from
granting a superior or equal interest in those existing assets to a
second lender.
Contracts alone will prove inadequate, however, given the
means by which shareholders can transfer wealth. Monitoring may
also be necessary to prevent asset substitutions, shareholder theft,
or diversion of profitable opportunities. Even though the contract
between the debtor and the lender may bar asset substitution, and
the applicable legal regime surely bars shareholder theft, the con-
tract and the laws are not self-enforcing. If the debtor can proceed
unilaterally once it receives the loan, the creditors will need to
monitor the debtor in order to protect their own interests.3'
A few examples will illustrate the difficulty of trying to elimi-
nate debtor misbehavior solely through contractual terms. Con-
sider an example that will occupy much of this Article. A debtor
has a choice between two investment projects. Each project re-
quires the debtor to borrow $100.32 Project 1 is certain to yield
$115. Project 2 is a high-risk project: ninety percent of the time it
yields $40, and the remaining ten percent of the time it yields
$635. Note that the expected payoff for Project 2 is $99.50, less
than the $100 (in expected value) the debtor would have to pay
risk-neutral creditors to finance the project.33
29 See Fama and Miller, The Theory of Finance at 151-52 (cited in note 27); James S.
Ang and Jess H. Chua, Coalitions, the Me-First Rule, and the Liquidation Decision, 11 Bell
J Econ 355 (1980); Michelle J. White, Public Policy Toward Bankruptcy: Me-First and
Other Priority Rules, 11 Bell J Econ 550 (1980).
30 See Schwartz, 18 J Legal Stud 209 (cited in note 27).
3 Note that I focus on monitoring after the debtor receives the money. Monitoring, or
screening, surely takes place before the creditor lends the money as well. See, for example,
Barry E. Adler, A New Perspective on the Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 22 J Legal Stud
(forthcoming 1993). Prescreening, however, does not prevent misbehavior after the fact.
32 Fixing the level of outside investment required puts to one side interactive effects
between contract design and investment. For a discussion of credit contract design, see
Douglas Gale and Martin Hellwig, Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period
Problem, 52 Rev Econ Stud 647 (1985).
31 For simplicity, I assume throughout a risk-free rate of interest of zero percent.
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In a world of full information and complete enforcement of
contracts, the problem of debtor misbehavior is readily solvable
through contracts. If the creditors think that the debtor will un-
dertake Project 1, financing will be readily forthcoming, because
the sure return of $115 more than covers the required debt pay-
ments of $100. In contrast, lenders will not finance Project 2, be-
cause its expected payout is not enough to repay the $100 loan.
Problems arise, however, if the creditors cannot control which
project the debtor chooses to undertake. As long as the debtor can-
not credibly commit to undertaking Project 1, it will be tempted to
undertake Project 2, regardless of what it tells the creditors at the
time of the loan. If the debtor chooses Project 2, the firm will fail
ninety percent of the time and leave the debtor with nothing. But
ten percent of the time, the debtor will net $535. Adopting Project
2 therefore yields the debtor, on average, $53.50. Project 2 is there-
fore attractive to the debtor because the debtor will net only $15
from Project 1. The creditors, by contrast, enjoy none of the gain if
Project 2 succeeds and suffer the costs if it fails. 4 If the debtor
invests in Project 2, the creditors recover, on average, only $46 of
the $100 they are owed, while they are sure to be paid in full if the
debtor chooses Project 1. Given the debtor's incentives, the credi-
tors will not lend to the debtor if they cannot ensure that it will
invest in Project 1 rather than Project 2.
The debtor and the creditors, therefore, will want to alter the
debtor's incentives in choosing between the two projects. The
debtor may make the following promise: "If Project 2 is chosen, I
promise to give you all of the revenues; otherwise, I will pay you
$100." I will call this a "forcing contract."35 Given the assumption
of full information-meaning here that the information is both im-
mediately known to both parties 8 and is immediately communica-
ble to any third party 7-the creditors will know immediately if
the debtor chooses Project 2. Given the assumption of complete
enforcement of contracts, the creditors can then enforce the
debtor's promise to turn over all of the revenues from the project.
" This example assumes that the investment project is the borrower's only asset, so
that the creditor cannot recover against other assets.
" See Eric Rasmusen, Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory 138
(Basil Blackwell, 1989).
3' That is, in the standard language of the theory of contracts, the information is "ob-
servable." See Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, in Truman F.
Bewley, ed, Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress 71, 134 (Cambridge,
1987).
'7 That is, the information is "verifiable." See id.
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As a result, the debtor will always select Project 1. If the debtor
makes this commitment, debt financing for Project 1 will be read-
ily forthcoming. Note, of course, that many other contracts bring
about the same result in a world of full information and complete
enforcement. Any promise that has the effect of making the
debtor's overall wealth lower when it chooses Project 2 over Pro-
ject 1 will bring about the same result.
But information is never perfect, and courts limit the range of
contracts that they will enforce. The self-enforcing commitment
that is almost tautologically available with full information and
complete enforcement, therefore, disappears in a more realistic set-
ting. Enforcement of the forcing contract requires that the credi-
tors actually know which project the debtor chose; in practice,
however, they typically will not know. From the creditor's perspec-
tive, everything depends on taking from the debtor any incentive
to choose Project 2; but the debtor will have an incentive to choose
Project 2 as long as the creditors cannot monitor what the debtor
is doing because monitoring is too costly.
Consider again the forcing contract. The debtor promises to
pay all of Project 2's revenues to the creditor if the debtor chooses
Project 2, but only $100 if it chooses Project 1. If the creditors
spent nothing on verifying project choice, the debtor would lose its
incentive to choose Project 1. Following its economic interests, the
debtor could choose Project 2. If the project failed, the debtor
might turn over the $40 as per the contract, but if the project suc-
ceeded, it would turn over only $100. The decision to choose Pro-
ject 2 would violate the contract, but without additional investiga-
tion, the creditors will not know whether the debtor in fact has
chosen Project 2. Two different events-choice of Project 1 or
choice of Project 2 and success-are consistent with the payment
of the $100, even though only the former complies with the con-
tract. To distinguish these two situations the creditors would have
to make costly after-the-fact inquiries. Part of what may separate
creditors from debtors is precisely the debtor's superior expertise
in knowing which project it should choose and even what project it
has chosen.
One might address this problem by expanding the scope of the
contract. Contracts could depend on the debtor's choice of project,
the realized state of the world, the payments actually made by the
debtor, and the information investment (or monitoring) decisions
made by the creditors. Ultimately, however, the creditors must
confront the difficulty of drafting a contract sophisticated enough
to give the debtor the right incentives and simple enough to allow
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them to monitor the debtor's performance cheaply. Even if the
creditors are able to surmount these barriers, they still face the
burden of persuading a third party that the debtor has in fact bro-
ken its promises. Even if the gap between creditor and debtor in-
formation regarding project choice can be narrowed (though at a
cost), there is no assurance that the creditor can communicate this
information effectively to a judge or jury.
B. Externalities in Monitoring and the Optimal Level of
Monitoring
Given the inability of contractual terms alone to ensure appro-
priate behavior by the debtor, creditors commonly monitor their
debtors. As already noted, creditors fear that their debtors will
take inappropriate risks, or simply steal, and will thereby dissipate
the assets otherwise available to satisfy their claims. When there
are many creditors, there is the additional problem of ensuring
that creditors do not duplicate each other's monitoring efforts. In-
troducing more than one creditor also creates monitoring problems
among the creditors. Creditors fear their fellow creditors. When
the going gets tough, the tough creditor gets going: aggressive cred-
itors seek payment of their claims in full from the failing debtor
with the hope of avoiding the pro rata payment regime that would
otherwise apply in bankruptcy. Given that seizure of property de-
termines priority to that property, each unsecured creditor needs
to worry that other creditors will exercise their right to withdraw
assets from the debtor in the wake of a default. Creditors will mon-
itor their debtor both to decide when to withdraw assets and to
prevent asset withdrawals by their fellow creditors.
In these situations, it is possible to identify an optimal level of
monitoring. Whether that level of monitoring will result without
any effort to induce that outcome depends critically on the extent
to which monitoring externalities exist. If monitoring is a private
good-if monitoring by one creditor has no effect on a second cred-
itor-then the right level of monitoring may occur without the
need for any effort to induce that outcome. Although some forms
of monitoring are private goods, more often than not monitoring
involves externalities. Monitoring may confer positive externalities
on fellow creditors-for example, when one creditor's monitoring
results in the debtor remaining solvent. Or monitoring may inflict
negative externalities, as when one creditor's monitoring of the
debtor allows it to detect failure more quickly and thereby grab
the available assets first. In both of these situations, it will take
some work to get the right level of monitoring.
1992]
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The way in which these externalities work themselves out is
complex. For example, positive monitoring externalities do not
alone lead the creditors collectively to less than optimal monitor-
ing. If monitoring conferred special benefits to the monitor that
were not available to the rest of the group, for example, monitoring
might be set at the socially optimal amount notwithstanding the
externality. Indeed, beating the pro rata rule might be the compen-
sation required to induce an unsecured creditor to monitor the
debtor.38 The right of the trustee to recover eve-of-bankruptcy
transfers, however, undercuts the possibility of inducing the un-
secured creditor to monitor.3 9 Identifying this benefit to the moni-
toring creditor, however, does not tell us how coordination is to be
achieved among the potential monitors. An equilibrium would
seem to require that each creditor have fairly detailed knowledge
of the benefits and costs of monitoring of the other creditors.
Again, the full extent of the externalities depends critically on
assumptions made about monitoring. In fact, one rough way of or-
ganizing much of the literature on the problem of the misbehaving
debtor and secured credit is to look to the monitoring assumptions
made by various scholars. The critical point over which they disa-
gree is the extent to which the secured creditor can tailor its moni-
toring to a particular situation.
On one view, the secured lender specializes and takes a secur-
ity interest only in a well-defined category of assets, such as equip-
ment, inventory or receivables. The secured creditor's monitoring
of how the debtor treats its equipment does not spill over to moni-
toring the debtor's other assets. The only comfort that the un-
secured creditors can take from the secured creditor's monitoring
is that it reduces the chance that the secured creditor will later
seek to share in the assets not subject to the security interest. De-
spite the monitoring, however, the debtor may still misbehave with
the unliened assets. This vision of monitoring is seen in work by
Jackson and Kronman,40 and by Baird.4 '
The second view of monitoring assumes that spillovers are in-
evitable. For example, the debtor loses absolute discretion over in-
ventory when a secured creditor monitors receivables. Other credi-
38 This is precisely the explanation given for allowing bank depositors to withdraw on
demand in Charles W. Calomiris and Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in
Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81 Am Econ Rev 497 (1991).
" See 11 USC § 547 (1988).
40 See Jackson and Kronman, 88 Yale L J at 1154 n 44 (cited in note 4).
11 See Baird, The Deep Structure of Article 9 at § 1.03 (cited in note 4).
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tors anticipate the spillover and adjust their monitoring
accordingly. In the extreme, monitoring by one creditor prevents
all misbehavior, leaving only the issue of allocating the burden of
monitoring. This view captures the essence of the public good as-
pect present in the enforcement of group rights. It also reflects the
idea that tailoring is costly and we often live in a one-size-fits-all
world. Many lenders have standard procedures for their auditors to
follow for each particular kind of debtor they service. It is a means
of economizing on their internal decisionmaking and controlling
their internal principal-agent problems. Tailoring also may be ir-
relevant if the paradigm secured transaction is the all-assets lender
taking a security interest in everything that Article 9, applicable
real estate law, and the remaining common law that fills the gaps
between the two allows. This vision of monitoring is seen in the
work of Levmore.42
My analysis builds on the latter work. To highlight the prob-
lem of coordinating the actions of creditors, I make several simpli-
fying assumptions. I take the cost of monitoring needed to curb
misbehavior as a given, fixed cost. Moreover, if any creditor
monitors the debtor, all debtor misbehavior is prevented. Monitor-
ing by additional creditors adds nothing. I make a similar assump-
tion for creditor withdrawals. If one (and only one) creditor
monitors, that creditor will be able to withdraw assets successfully
in the event of a pending debtor failure, and will thereby avoid the
pro rata payment regime. If more than one creditor monitors, all
withdrawals are prevented, and if the debtor fails, pro rata pay-
ments are made. Note that under these assumptions monitoring is
a public good. Monitoring by one creditor prevents all misbehavior,
and each creditor benefits when misbehavior is prevented. Because
of the assumption that monitoring costs are fixed, the monitor can-
not individuate its monitoring decisions. The model therefore does
not account for the possibility that the amount of monitoring a
creditor chooses might be optimal for that creditor but suboptimal
for the creditors as a whole.
As noted, the assumption that monitoring by one creditor is
sufficient to prevent all debtor misbehavior captures the public
good problem. Public goods and free riding go hand in hand. As a
group, creditors face the question of how to coordinate their indi-
vidual decisionmaking so as to reach the outcome that is best for
"' See Levmore, 92 Yale L J at 53-59 (cited in note 4); Schwartz, 37 Vand L Rev at
1056-57 (cited in note 2), also uses this monitoring approach in discussing Levmore's work,
though it is not clear that he embraces it.
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the group as a whole. The creditors could coordinate through di-
rect contracts among themselves to allocate monitoring responsi-
bility and cost-sharing. This would require a complex web of con-
tracts among the creditors and would almost surely be costly to
implement. Although we do see bilateral contracts, such as subor-
dination agreements, among some creditors, we rarely see fully
specified contracts among all the creditors.
Alternatively, following the public goods literature,43 some sort
of intermediate device could be interposed between the debtor and
the creditors. Indeed, banks and other financial intermediaries
play such a role in aggregating the otherwise separate actions and
information of their depositors.44 For the purposes of this Article, I
ignore the possibilities of interposing an aggregation mechanism
between the creditors and the debtor, or of allowing the creditors
to enter into contracts among themselves regarding monitoring. Al-
though some creditors can coordinate their actions, situations arise
in which they cannot. These situations give rise to the public good
problem in monitoring on which I focus.
III. A MODEL OF EFFICIENT MONITORING OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS
In this section, I examine the relationship between monitoring
efficiency and the debtor's capital structure. To analyze this rela-
tionship, I will use the common setting of an entrepreneur seeking
investment capital for a project from two creditors. I consider
three cases: a simple debtor-misbehavior model, a simple common
pool model, and a combined debtor-misbehavior/common pool
model. Before looking at the cases, I will sketch the current state
of the literature and how my results compare.
The debate over the effects of secured credit has taken a series
of turns, focusing exclusively on the effects of security interests on
debtor misbehavior. In their early work, Jackson and Kronman fo-
cused on the need to monitor possible debtor misbehavior, arguing
that high-cost monitors should obtain security interests to reduce
their need to monitor. Levmore criticized this work, because it
rested on the unlikely premise that secured creditors would be less
"I See, for example, Christopher Bliss and Barry Nalebuff, Dragon-Slaying and Ball-
room Dancing: The Private Supply of a Public Good, 25 J Pub Econ 1 (1984); Glenn W.
Harrison and Jack Hirshleifer, An Experimental Evaluation of Weakest Link/Best Shot
Models of Public Goods, 97 J Pol Econ 201 (1989).
44 See Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, 51
Rev Econ Stud 393 (1984).
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efficient monitors than unsecured creditors.4 5 Levmore instead pur-
sued the debtor-misbehavior model and argued that secured credit
responded to the problems of (1) free riding on monitoring and (2)
duplication in monitoring among unsecured creditors.46 Schwartz,
in turn, criticized Levmore's description of the debtor-misbehavior
model, arguing that an equilibrium in which only one creditor
monitors will result without any capital structure design.47
Schwartz noted that in a multiple creditor model, having only one
unsecured creditor monitor forms an equilibrium, given the as-
sumptions about monitoring. Duplicate monitoring or no monitor-
ing at all are then disequilibrium phenomena. From this Schwartz
concluded that "the stable, pervasive existence of personal prop-
erty security is quite unlikely to be a response to the dise-
quilibrium phenomenon of duplicate monitoring. 48
My analysis revisits this analysis for the question of debtor
misbehavior and breaks new ground by confronting the creditor
misbehavior problems of the common pool. Under the simple
debtor-misbehavior model, Schwartz's conclusion regarding the ab-
sence of a need for secured credit seems right, but his analysis re-
mains incomplete. The monitoring game played among the credi-
tors is characterized by multiple equilibria.49 Schwartz understood
that multiple equilibria would exist, but did not view that as prob-
lematic. Multiple equilibria, though, usually pose thorny coordina-
tion problems. Indeed, the debtor monitoring game played by the
creditors is similar to the well-known "Battle of the Sexes" game.0
" See Levmore, 92 Yale L J at 52-53 (cited in note 4).
16 Id at 53-55.
47 See Schwartz, 37 Vand L Rev at 1055-59 (cited in note 2).
" Id at 1057.
" The problems associated with multiple equilibria-or, to put it differently, situations
in which the applicable solution concept cannot distinguish among a number of "reasona-
ble" outcomes and identify a single outcome as "the" solution-are increasingly a focus of
research. For representative examples, see Paul Krugman, History versus Expectations, 106
Q J Econ 651 (1991); Eric B. Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer and John S. Wiley, Jr., Naked
Exclusion, 81 Am Econ Rev 1137 (1991); Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer and Robert
Vishny, Industrialization and the Big Push, 97 J Pol Econ 1003 (1989). See also Alan
Schwartz, Bankruptcy, Workout, and Debt Contrast, (unpublished manuscripts, April 1992,
(on file with U Chi L Rev)).
50 The Battle of the Sexes takes its name from the following situation. A man and a
woman have tickets for a prize fight and a ballet on the same evening. They cannot commu-
nicate with each other and must choose independently which event to attend. One person
prefers the boxing, the other the ballet-you can guess the assumed match between sex and
entertainment tastes-and hence the name of the game. The couple would like to be to-
gether, and, in fact, each person gets more pleasure from attending either event with the
other than from attending that person's preferred event alone. This last fact creates the
multiple equilibria: game theory predicts that they will attend together-they will coordi-
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However, unlike the typical Battle of the Sexes game in which the
players seek to coordinate on playing the same strategy, creditors
seek to coordinate on playing different strategies. Because of the
multiplicity of equilibria, there can be no assurance that the credi-
tors will appropriately coordinate their decisions. I suggest that
eliminating multiple equilibria is a critical component of capital
structure design. However, security interests are unnecessary to
create a monitoring game with a single solution.5'
More importantly, I argue that responding to the problem of
creditor misbehavior is of substantial importance in the design of
capital structures. Creditor misbehavior can take the form of the
Prisoner's Dilemma. Unlike the Battle of the Sexes with its multi-
ple equilibria, here a unique solution exists, but it is a poor one.
We need capital structure design to get to a different solution; se-
curity interests can serve as the mechanism for reaching that supe-
rior solution.
A. General Statement of the Model
As Section II suggests, a full-blown model of contracting in
multiple creditor contexts would be dauntingly complex. The
model that I offer sidesteps this problem by focusing on particular,
well-known contractual forms for debt. The model proceeds in four
stages.
In the first stage, the debtor enters the lending market and
signs two contracts providing total financing of D for its invest-
ment project. D is assumed here to be $100. I also assume that the
firm will have two creditors, because secured and unsecured credi-
tors are indistinguishable if the debtor has only a single creditor.
Label the lending creditors C1 and C2. At stage one, C1 lends an
amount dl at a fee schedule fl and C2 does the same for d 2 at
schedule f2. A fee schedule may simply be an interest rate, but it
may also include contingent charges, such as reimbursement for le-
gal fees, monitoring costs and the like. The assumption of two
creditors could be justified in a more general setting, 2 but opera-
tionally, the firm will be required to choose di , the face amount of
nate their strategies-but it cannot tell us whether they will go to the fight or the ballet. See
Rasmusen, Games and Information at 34-35 (cited in note 35).
Though there are caveats. See note 60.
62 The assumption that a debtor borrows from more than one creditor is common. See,
for example, Jackson and Kronman, 88 Yale L J at 1158 n 55 (cited in note 4), but it would
be better to have that result appear endogenously in a more general model. The result itself
might be justified on the risks of instability associated with having a single supplier of any
good. It is common wisdom that it is prudent for a firm to have relationships with more
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the debt owed to creditor i, from the range 0 < d i < D for all i,
such that dl + d 2 = D. I assume that the lending market is com-
petitive and has a risk-free rate of return set at 0%.
The central question explored in stage one is whether security
interests have any role to play in the presence of other standard
contractual terms. I assume contracts to be standard debt con-
tracts, meaning a fixed amount is to be repaid, subject to solvency
constraints. Three choices are allowed. First, debt may be secured
or unsecured; but, of course, in the two-creditor model, only one
creditor can be secured. Second, the contract may or may not spec-
ify partial or full reimbursement of creditor monitoring costs.
Third, the debtor can distribute the debt D between C1 and C2
arbitrarily, subject to the debt floor required to ensure a model
with two creditors in equilibrium.
In stage two, after lending, the creditors simultaneously make
their individual decisions as to whether to monitor the debtor.
This monitoring is assumed to gather information covering possi-
ble debtor misbehavior and possible creditor misbehavior in the
models where both are possible. This assumes economies of scale
in monitoring. Monitoring is costly, and I will assume that there is
a fixed cost of monitoring at stage two, call it k 1 for creditor C1
and k2 for creditor C2. Furthermore assume that k 1 is $5 and k2 is
$8.
In stage three, in light of the monitoring decisions, the debtor
chooses between Projects 1 and 2. The debtor will choose Project 2
if neither creditor monitors and if Project 2 is preferred by the
debtor to Project 1. The debtor will choose Project 1 if either cred-
itor monitors the debtor. In stage four, nature moves and deter-
mines the project's outcome.
I ignore the possibility of direct contracts between the credi-
tors or between the creditors and an intermediary that deals with
the debtor. Allowing either of these would undercut the central as-
sumption that the debtor has two creditors acting noncoopera-
tively. I also assume that the creditors' monitoring decisions are
fully revealed only after the fact, so that there are no strategic is-
sues raised with regard to reimbursing monitoring costs and the
like.
than one vendor to prevent dislocations that might arise if the vendor failed or switched
supply policies.
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B. The Debtor-Misbehavior Model
The first model explores whether a security interest is re-
quired to induce efficient monitoring. Return to the case in which
the debtor may invest in one of two projects. Each project requires
debt financing totalling $100. Project 1 is certain to yield $115.
Project 2 is a high-risk project: ninety percent of the time it yields
$40, and the remaining ten percent of the time it yields $635. As
noted, the expected payoff for Project 2 is $99.50, which, of course,
is less than the $100 (in expected value) the debtor would have to
pay risk-neutral creditors to finance the project. The debtor has an
incentive to substitute Project 2 for Project 1, because it receives
most of the benefits of the high-risk/high-gain project and bears
few of its costs. In contrast, creditors expect to lose money if the
debtor is left unchecked and pursues Project 2. Hence, the credi-
tors will not invest unless they can effectively monitor the debtor.53
At the first stage, competition among potential lenders natu-
rally limits the fee schedules that they can charge to the debtor.
Therefore, at the time it makes the loan, each creditor should ex-
pect to earn just a competitive rate of return. The payoffs occur
only after the second stage of the monitoring game is complete.
For this reason, the creditors and the debtor need to anticipate the
monitoring decisions that each party will make in the monitoring
subgame. Creditors must expect to earn at least a competitive rate
of return given the monitoring costs they will face. If the two pro-
posed fee schedules in the first stage would lead either creditor to
anticipate a subcompetitive or supracompetitive rate of return be-
cause of the monitoring decisions those fee schedules would gener-
ate, new fee schedules are needed.
Assume initially that the $100 risk-free debt is split evenly be-
tween C1 and C2 . The lenders have two decisions to make. First,
each creditor must set a fee schedule for lending. Second, each
creditor must decide whether to monitor the debtor. Suppose that
botb creditors make their first-stage decisions on the assumption
that C1 will monitor and C2 will not. Given the underlying moni-
toring technology and the certainty of debtor misbehavior without
monitoring, the only possible equilibrium has one (and only one)
creditor monitoring. 54 Now consider the fee schedules of the credi-
tors. C2 will seek payment of the amount lent plus interest at the
5 Recall that monitoring is assumed to be indivisible and that monitoring by one credi-
tor suffices to prevent misbehavior.
" As has been noted before. See Schwartz, 37 Vand L Rev at 1057 (cited in note ).
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risk-free rate, or $50. Suppose that C1 simply builds the monitor-
ing charge into the interest rate and therefore seeks payment of
$55.
This arrangement forms a Nash equilibrium. That is, given
the actions of the others, neither the debtor nor C1 or C2 can im-
prove its position by deviating from its courses of action. C2 will
plan not to monitor, given that C1 will plan to do so. Furthermore,
given that C1 will plan to monitor, the debtor will not be able to
misbehave. Therefore the loans will be paid in full, and C2 must
offer the competitive rate on its loan. Given that C2 will not plan
to monitor, C1 will plan to monitor, thereby preventing the debtor
from misbehaving. C1 will charge an interest rate set to cover just
its $5 monitoring costs. Note that the debtor gains nothing by re-
distributing its borrowing between the two creditors. Given the as-
sumptions used by the creditors in setting their lending fees, each
charges just the risk-free rate, and C1 builds the monitoring charge
into the interest rate.
Up to this point however, we have failed to take into account
that creditors make interest rate and monitoring decisions in se-
quence. When the creditors make their second-stage monitoring
decisions, they face the following payoff matrix:
C2
Not Monitor Monitor
C1 Not Monitor [24,22] [55,42]
Monitor [50,50] [50,42]
FIGURE 1.1: PAYOFFS WITHOUT CONTINGENT REIMBURSEMENT
That is, if neither creditor monitors, the debtor misbehaves. The
alternative project succeeds ten percent of the time and the credi-
tors are paid in full. But ninety percent of the time the project
fails, and $40 is available to be divided pro rata on Cl's claim of
$55 and C2's claim of $50. Taken together, this results in an ex-
pected payoff of $24 to C1 and of $22 to C2. If C1 monitors and C2
does not, the debtor will not misbehave; both creditors are paid in
full and C1 nets $50 ($55 less $5 monitoring cost). Note that both
creditors earn the risk-free rate when monitoring occurs as con-
templated when the interest rates were set. If C2 monitors and C1
does not, again the debtor behaves and both creditors are paid in
full, but C1 earns a supracompetitive return. C1 set its interest
rate to reflect the cost of monitoring, but did not actually monitor.
C2's monitoring saved C1 from the costs of the debtor's misbehav-
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ior. In contrast, C2 earns less than the risk-free rate because it
paid $50 but spent $8 in monitoring costs. C2 bears the cost of
monitoring without charging for it. In the final cell, both creditors
monitor, C1 earns a competitive rate and C2 again loses out.
Note that both of the cells in which one creditor monitors are
Nash equilibria. If C1 monitors, C2 will not, and if C2 does not, C1
will. Similarly, if C2 monitors, C1 will not, and if C1 does not, then
C2 will, notwithstanding that the creditors contemplated a differ-
ent result when they originally set the lending charges. The sec-
ond-stage monitoring game exhibits two pure strategy Nash
equilibria.
This game has the form of the Battle of the Sexes game, ex-
cept that the players seek to play different strategies rather than
the same strategy. The multiple equilibria give rise to a coordina-
tion problem, and the Nash conception alone provides no way to
select between them. To be sure, the parties anticipated one of
these subgame results. But given the essential simultaneity of the
monitoring decisions by each creditor, there is nothing that makes
one solution the obvious choice. We would not think the outcome
obvious if we simply began with the monitoring subgame. It is hard
to see why one outcome becomes more likely merely because we
have embedded the monitoring subgame into the larger fee-setting
and monitoring game. Sometimes embedding may help achieve a
solution,55 but this is not one of those times. The creditors here are
not indifferent among the equilibria. Each would prefer to freeride
on the monitoring efforts of the other, and receive full (or more
than full) payment without incurring the monitoring costs.
One should note that the outcome in which C2 monitors and
C1 does not should not be an equilibrium in the original game. In
the stage one model, the creditors premised the interest rates on
C1 monitoring and C2 not monitoring. In this outcome, C1 earns a
supracompetitive return and C2 a subcompetitive one. Because the
debtor ultimately bears the cost of monitoring, it will seek an ar-
rangement that has a unique equilibrium in the original game and
all subgames. The debtor and its creditors will try to create a pay-
off structure at the first stage such that there will be a single equi-
librium at the second stage. To put the point formally, the first-
stage structure should be considered a possible solution if (1) the
" See, for example, Elon Kohlberg and Jean-Francois Mertens, On the Strategic Sta-
bility of Equilibria, 54 Econometrica 1003 (1986).
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resulting monitoring subgame is dominance solvable5s and (2)
given the anticipated outcome in the subgame, the creditors earn
only a competitive rate of return given the design of the first-stage
structure.
To put the point another way, the central problems facing the
debtor and its creditors include assigning the role of monitor, en-
suring that the monitor actually does monitor, and creating a
mechanism that properly compensates the monitor for assuming
this burden. The firm's capital structure at the outset should be
designed to eliminate the indeterminacy associated with multiple
Nash equilibria in the monitoring subgame. One way of doing this
is to ensure that the resulting monitoring subgame is dominance
solvable.
Consider these ideas in the context of the simple misbehavior
model. Rather than covering the monitoring costs through the in-
terest rate, the debtor should agree to pay a separate monitoring
charge to, say C1 , if monitoring costs are incurred. That would give
the following payoff matrix in the monitoring subgame:51
C2
Not Monitor Monitor
C1 Not Monitor [23,23] [50,42]
Monitor [50,50] [50,42]
FIGURE 1.2: PAYOFFS WITH CONTINGENT REIMBURSEMENT
The revised game has the same two pure-strategy Nash equi-
libria, but there is an important difference between this game and
the original subgame. For C1 , monitoring weakly dominates not-
monitoring. Although C1 will always net $50 if it monitors, it may
net only $23 if it does not. That is, C1 will never do worse by mon-
itoring, and may do better, and therefore C1 should monitor. As a
result, C2 should recognize that C1 will monitor, and therefore C2
need not monitor. In effect, we can remove the weakly-dominated
strategies" from consideration and instead focus on the new payoff
matrix:
56 A general discussion of dominance solvability may be found in David M. Kreps, A
Course in Microeconomic Theory 417-21 (Princeton, 1990).
57 As before, here and subsequently, payoffs in figures are the expected payoffs calcu-
lated using the probability distributions given for a particular project.
53 Strategy A is weakly dominated by strategy B if B always results in as large a payoff
to the player as A and sometimes results in a larger payoff. Weakly-dominated strategies are
discussed in Kreps, A Course in Microeconomic Theory at 417-21 (cited in note 56).
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C2
Not Monitor Monitor
C1 Monitor [50,501 [50,42]
FIGURE 1.3: PAYOFFS AFTER ELIMINATION OF
C I 'S WEAKLY DOMINATED STRATEGY
Given this, C2 will choose not to monitor.59
This is a general result so long as the monitoring creditor
knows that it will be paid in full if the debtor behaves. When the
monitoring creditor is unsecured, however, it will be paid in full
only if the debtor pays all unsecured creditors (and any senior
creditors) in full as well. Given the assumptions that neither credi-
tor will be paid in full if the debtor misbehaves and that the moni-
toring costs of C1 are fully repaid, C1 never does worse by moni-
toring and often does better. As before, C1 should monitor, and C2
should not. Note that the creditors need very little specific infor-
mation to reach these conclusions. Indeed, C1 needs to know only
that it will receive less than full payment if the debtor misbehaves,
and C2 needs to know only that fact and that the debtor will fully
reimburse Cl's monitoring costs. The game with contingent pay-
ment of monitoring costs is dominance solvable, which suggests
that we can avoid the indeterminacy of multiple Nash equilibria in
the monitoring subgame through the device of contingent full-pay-
ment of monitoring costs. It is quite common for a loan contract to
8 There are, of course, criticisms that can be leveled against this approach. In particu-
lar, Nozick and others have set forth examples of games in which playing a dominant strat-
egy leads to what might be considered unreasonable results. See Robert Nozick, Newcomb's
Problem and Two Principles of Choice, in Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden, eds,
Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem
107-29 (British Columbia, 1985). From that, these critics have argued that a different deci-
sionmaking rule is needed, since the dominance rule does a poor job on fringe cases. In this
Article, however, I use the concept of dominance solvability in the context of simple sub-
games that present none of the problematic fringe cases. No one suggests that a richer deci-
sionmaking rule that could replace the dominance rule would lead to different results in
those cases that we now consider readily solved under the dominance rule. Indeed, we would
probably consider the new rule seriously flawed if it did. Other scholars have objected to the
use of dominance arguments on different grounds. See, for example, Roger B. Myerson,
Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict 192-95 (Harvard, 1991).
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include provisions for reimbursement of the expenses involved in
monitoring collateral, through the use of attorneys or the like.
What this means then is that we cannot justify the use of se-
curity interests, even after we have addressed the problem of mul-
tiple Nash equilibria.6 0 Fortunately, debtor misbehavior is only
half of the story; the second half is creditor misbehavior.
C. Creditor Misbehavior
The possibility that a creditor will monitor its debtor's sol-
vency follows directly from introducing even a single debt into an
all-equity firm. Introducing more than one unsecured creditor cre-
ates a richer set of monitoring possibilities and needs. These are
the problems of the common pool. It is very simple for the all-
equity firm to coordinate its decisionmaking. Collective action by
shareholders is the norm. The shareholders, as a group, decide on
the hiring and firing of managers, investment strategies and indeed
on the firm's continued existence. Individual shareholders cannot
60 It may be possible to resurrect security interests even for debtor misbehavior. The
examples in the text assume that monitoring the debtor results in success of the project. In
reality, a project may fail even if a creditor monitors the debtor. Project success depends on
more than just the debtor making the right decisions. Full reimbursement of monitoring
costs no longer suffices to make the monitoring subgame dominance solvable, but it does if
coupled with a security interest in favor of the monitor. More precisely, contingent full-
payment of monitoring costs coupled with a security interest will result in a dominance-
solvable monitoring subgame if two conditions are satisfied: (1) if the debtor misbehaves,
there is a chance that the secured creditor will receive only partial payment; and (2) if the
debtor is monitored and behaves, the secured creditor is sure to be paid in full, even if the
other creditor is not.
Both of these conditions may be plausible. Although for purposes of exposition I have
modeled the debtor's misbehavior as choosing a particular alternative investment project,
there is almost no limit on the extent to which a debtor can misbehave. For any particular
secured obligation, we can probably imagine misbehavior that would result in only partial
payment (or perhaps even no payment) to the secured creditor. The second condition is also
plausible, especially if we recognize that the division of the debt among the creditors is not
set exogenously but instead can be selected to ensure that the second condition for domi-
nance solvability is satisfied. Operationally, the amount of the debt owed to the secured
creditor must be capped by the bottom of the distribution of returns on the debtor's project.
In a world of perfect information about that distribution that can be done easily. Secured
lending is often done based on a percentage of asset value; coupling this with careful moni-
toring makes the second condition plausible as well. This condition also matches the com-
mon wisdom that secured creditors usually are paid in full in bankruptcies. (For once, the
common wisdom also seems to be right. See, for example, Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy
Resolution: Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J Fin Econ 285, 295
(1990).)
Note, though, I have suggested only that full-cost reimbursement with a security inter-
est is sufficient for dominance solvability; other devices such as paying more than full-cost
reimbursement or rapid repayment of monitoring costs might have the same effect.
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unilaterally withdraw assets from the firm. They must act in con-
cert with the other shareholders.
Debt changes decisionmaking about the firm's assets. Joint
decisionmaking by shareholders is supplemented by individual
decisionmaking by creditors. Debt typically gives certain creditors
the right to withdraw assets from the firm without the consent of
fellow creditors or of equityholders. For unsecured creditors, with-
drawal of the assets also establishes priority to the assets.
Each withdrawal harms creditors in as many as three ways.
First, assets may be withdrawn from the firm and sold for too lit-
tle. This is the risk of inefficient sales. The holder of a $100 debt
removes the firm's printing press and sells it for $100, notwith-
standing that a more diligent seller would have received $150 for
the press. To be sure, the seller has to satisfy certain norms,
though they are typically procedural and not substantive." But it
may do so without necessarily receiving full price for the good sold.
Such sales occur because the withdrawing creditor bears none of
the loss in value from the inefficient sale.
Second, withdrawal of assets may break up efficient combina-
tions of assets. The printing press may be worth $100 standing
alone, the dyes for the press worth $25 standing alone, and the
press and the dyes worth $150 if sold together. The creditor owed
$100 may withdraw the press alone and inflict a $25 loss on the
remaining creditors. Again, the creditor bears none of the losses
associated with the sale.
Third, and finally, even if there are no asset synergies and
withdrawn assets are sold for full value, any withdrawal reduces
the pool of assets otherwise available. Each creditor will monitor
other creditors in an effort to police the pro rata distribution rules
of bankruptcy. All of this follows from the three initial premises of
unilateral withdrawal rights, the link between withdrawal and pri-
ority, and an undifferentiated debt structure. In actuality, unilat-
eral withdrawal rights are common and may even define the debt
contract. Although one can imagine debt without the right to seize
assets, such debt puts the creditor at the risk of a debtor's spiteful
refusal to pay. Because these features seem fixed, I consider only
1 See, for example, the commercial reasonableness standard applicable to secured sell-
ers under UCC § 9-504, and note the safe harbor of UCC § 9-507(2) ("The fact that a better
price could have been obtained by a sale at a different time or in a different method from
that selected by the secured party is not of itself sufficient to establish that the sale was not
made in a commercially reasonable manner.").
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the issues raised by creditor monitoring of withdrawals to prevent
deviations from the pro rata distribution rules.
Consider the debtor again and its investment project. Assume
that the debtor cannot misbehave. Here we have a new role for
monitoring and its consequences. If one creditor monitors, and the
other does not, the monitoring creditor will be able to detect
debtor failure and will withdraw assets from the debtor. Through
monitoring, the creditor will completely defeat the otherwise appli-
cable pro rata distribution rule. Note that, for the creditors as a
group, monitoring adds nothing; it simply redistributes value
among them. In the prior misbehavior model, monitoring reallo-
cated value between the debtor and the creditors as a group. The
debtor desired monitoring because only with monitoring could it
secure credit. In the common pool, monitoring confers no benefit
on the debtor. Indeed, monitoring imposes a cost on the debtor,
because the creditors will set their fee schedules to reflect the out-
come of the monitoring subgame.
Consider a low-risk debtor wishing to invest in a project with
an eighty percent chance of success. Furthermore, assume that if it
succeeds, the project results in total assets of $122.75, but if it
fails, the project's assets are worth $84. This gives the project an
expected value of $115, as before. Assume that the creditors make
their first-stage fee schedule decisions on the assumption that
neither player will monitor in the subgame. Now consider the re-
sulting payoff matrix when the monitoring subgame is played:
C2
Not Monitor Monitor
Not Monitor [50,50] [48,44]
Monitor [47,48] [45,42]
FIGURE 2.1: PAYOFFS IN PURE COMMON POOL MODEL:
THE UNSECURED CASE, Low-RISK DEBTOR
This game is dominance solvable. 2 C1 will not monitor, regardless
of what C2 does, and C2 will not monitor either. The costs of mon-
02 Dominance solvable signifies here that the best course of action for each player is
independent of what the other player does. When C2 does not monitor, C, earns $50 instead
of $47 if it does not monitor; when C2 monitors, C1 earns $48 instead of $45 if it does not.
Similarly, when C, does not monitor, C2 earns $50 instead of $44 if it does not monitor;
when C1 does monitor, C2 earns $48 instead of $42 by not monitoring. Both are better off
not monitoring, regardless of what the other does.
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itoring exceed the benefits to be gained from avoiding the pro rata
rule, given the debtor firm's high probability of success.
Now suppose that the probability of success is only fifty per-
cent instead of eighty percent. The project now yields $146 if it
succeeds and $84 if it fails, giving once again an expected value of
$115. Assume, as in the prior example, that the creditors make
their first-stage fee schedule decisions based on the assumption
that neither player will monitor in the monitoring subgame. Now
consider the resulting payoff matrix in the subgame:
C2
Not Monitor Monitor
C, Not Monitor [50,501 [42,50]
Monitor [53,42] [45,42]
FIGURE 2.2: PAYOFFS IN PURE COMMON POOL MODEL:
THE UNSECURED CASE, HIGH-RISK DEBTOR,
No MONITORING EXPECTED
If the game played out as the creditors contemplated it would
when they set their fee schedules, each player would receive $50,
the appropriate competitive rate of return. But the game will not
play out that way. C1 will monitor, regardless of what C2 does, and
C2 will therefore earn a subcompetitive rate of return. That means
that C2 will reject the proposed fee-schedule pair, and the parties
will have to create a second set. Assume instead that the creditors
set their proposed fee schedules on the assumption that both play-
ers will monitor in the monitoring subgame. The following payoff
matrix will result:
C2
Not Monitor Monitor
Not Monitor [55,58] [40,65]
Monitor [64,44] [50,50]
FIGURE 2.3: PAYOFFS IN PURE COMMON POOL MODEL:
THE UNSECURED CASE, HIGH-RISK DEBTOR,
MONITORING EXPECTED
This is once again dominance solvable. C1 will monitor regard-
less of what C2 does, and the same is true for C2. Both creditors
monitor and earn competitive rates of return.
Under plausible circumstances, in a world of unsecured credit,
the problem of the common pool will result in the following moni-
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toring pattern. Creditors will not monitor low-risk debtors-a no-
monitoring equilibrium-because the cost of monitoring exceeds
the benefits gained from monitoring.63 Both creditors, however,
will monitor high-risk debtors-a dual-monitoring equilibrium.
That is, in a world of unsecured credit, it will be a dominant strat-
egy for each creditor to monitor a high-risk debtor at stage two.6 4
Each creditor will therefore set first-period interest rates on the
assumption that both creditors will monitor the solvency of the
high-risk firm. Because monitoring is costly, interest rates will
have to be higher to generate competitive returns. As a result,
monitoring will lower the value of the equity. In this model, moni-
toring creates no efficiencies and simply allocates value between
the creditors. In equilibrium, the creditors enjoy a competitive rate
of return and the debtor bears the cost of monitoring.
Introducing the possibility of secured credit changes the anal-
ysis. Issuing secured credit to one of the creditors may eliminate
the incentives for either creditor to monitor. The security interest
will be socially efficient if its cost is less than the total monitoring
costs of the two creditors. In the case of a low-risk debtor, neither
creditor will monitor. In the absence of the risk of such inefficient
monitoring, neither creditor will take a security interest. One cred-
itor, however, will take a security interest when the debtor is high-
risk in order to ensure that neither has the incentive to monitor
the debtor's insolvency. In short, this model predicts a pattern of
secured credit in which low-risk firms do not use secured credit,
while high-risk firms do. One can illustrate this point formally by
returning to the model. Assume that the debtor grants a security
interest in all of the firm's assets to C1. The creditors face the fol-
lowing payoff matrix in the monitoring subgame:6 5
"' The benefits of monitoring are either grabbing more than a pro rata share of the
assets or ensuring that one receives such a share.
" Having both creditors monitor will be the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in
the second-stage monitoring game. The bank run literature reflects the idea that withdrawal
is the dominant strategy if the bad state is known to have occurred. See, for example, James
S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory 215-18 (Belknap, 1990). Compare Andrew
Postlewaite and Xavier Vives, Bank Runs as an Equilibrium Phenomenon, 95 J Pol Econ
485 (1987).
"' The example sets the cost of issuing secured credit at $0, but this simplification does
not affect the results, because the cost of secured credit is sunk, once issued.
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C2
Not Monitor Monitor
C1 Not Monitor [50,50] [50,42]
Monitor [45,50] [45,42]
FIGURE 2.4: PAYOFFS IN PURE COMMON POOL MODEL:
THE SECURED CASE, HIGH-RISK DEBTOR
As before in the debtor-misbehavior model, given the assumption
that the total amount owed to C1 is less than the lowest possible
value for the project, C1 always collects in full, and not monitoring
dominates monitoring. C1 need not seek to deviate from the pro
rata rules or protect against a deviation. Instead, the upfront prior-
ity structure ensures that the debtor will repay C1 in full. Now
consider C2 's monitoring decision. In C2 's case as well, not moni-
toring dominates monitoring. Hence, neither creditor will
monitor.6
This model predicts that creditors will take security interests
only in high-risk firms. Creditors will not monitor low-risk firms
even if the debtor issues only unsecured credit. Taking a security
interest will introduce a cost without an offsetting benefit. For
high-risk firms, the debtor increases the value of its equity through
the use of secured credit as long as the costs associated with creat-
ing secured credit are less than the total monitoring costs of the
individual creditors. Simply raising the interest rate at stage one
will not alter these outcomes. Although raising the interest rate
cannot decrease the amount of monitoring, it may serve to increase
the amount of monitoring at stage two; conversely, lowering the
interest rate may decrease the amount of monitoring at stage two.
The central difference between this view of monitoring and
that of prior models is that here monitoring-at best-simply re-
distributes value among the creditors. Although not modeled here,
a more realistic assumption-and one more in tune with the com-
mon pool analogy-is that monitoring by creditors reduces the
amount of value available for distribution. In contrast, direct mon-
itoring of the project decisions of the debtor enhances value for
11 This model assumes that there are no undetected withdrawals of assets by creditors,
or, to put it another way, that recovering withdrawn assets is costless. That could be seen as
in tension with the usual perception that recovering debtor withdrawals is costly-therefore
justifying monitoring to nip fraudulent dividends in the bud. The key difference between
the two situations is that recovery from the defaulting debtor is much harder than recovery
from the typical creditor. The debtor is insolvent or disappears to Rio, but the creditor
generally is solvent and stays at home.
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creditors by preventing unilateral transfers of value to the debtor
through the adoption of high-risk projects.
This model suggests a plausible role for security interests. The
upfront priority a security interest creates minimizes the opportu-
nities for the end-of-game efforts to subvert the pro rata rule that
define the common pool problem. Second, and as important, the
model suggests that the common pool problem is not an immutable
feature of the relationship between a debtor and its multiple credi-
tors. Whether a common pool problem even exists depends on the
capital structure of the debtor. Note, though, that this model
predicts that no creditor monitors the debtor; such a prediction
surely is counter-factual. Therefore a third model is required, one
that combines debtor and creditor misbehavior.
D. Debtor and Creditor Misbehavior
In the combined-misbehavior model, the unmonitored debtor
will misbehave by switching to the high-risk project, and a moni-
toring unsecured creditor will seek to defeat the pro rata distribu-
tion rule. Monitoring has a dual character: it is useful because it
prevents debtor misbehavior and ensures investment in the best
projects. But monitoring is destructive in that it is the mechanism
that permits creditor misbehavior.
To reset the stage, the debtor will misbehave (by selecting
Project 2) if neither creditor monitors it. Project 2 fails ninety per-
cent of the time and is worth $40 and succeeds ten percent of the
time and is worth $635. For low-risk debtors, Project 1 succeeds
eighty percent of the time and is worth $122.75 and fails twenty
percent of the time and is worth $84. For high-risk debtors, Project
1 succeeds only fifty percent of the time and is worth $146 and
fails fifty percent of the time and is worth $84. If a creditor
monitors, the debtor cannot misbehave. But the creditor will seek
to cheat on the pro rata rule.
Start with low-risk debtors. If the parties set the first stage fee
schedules on the assumption that C1 will monitor and C2 will not,
and that C1 will be reimbursed for its monitoring costs only if it in
fact monitors, the following payoff matrix in the monitoring sub-
game will result:
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C2
Not Monitor Monitor
Not Monitor [22,24] [46,47]
Monitor [50,50] [47,45]
FIGURE 3.1: PAYOFFS IN COMBINED MODEL:
THE UNSECURED CASE, Low-RISK DEBTOR
This game is again dominance solvable. C1 will monitor, re-
gardless of what C2 does, and therefore C2 will not monitor. As in
the pure misbehavior model, monitoring is essential to prevent
debtor misbehavior. But given that C1 will be paid in full if it
monitors, there is no need for a security interest to reach this re-
sult. Moreover, C2 will not monitor for possible creditor misbehav-
ior by C1 given the high probability that the debtor's project will
succeed. As in the common pool model, the high probability of suc-
cess means that C2 will not monitor in an attempt to stop C1 from
deviating from the pro rata distribution rules. Security interests
are again irrelevant.
Now consider the high-risk debtor. Again if the parties set the
first-stage fee schedules on the assumption that C1 will monitor
and C2 will not, we get the following payoff matrix in the subgame:
C2
Not Monitor Monitor
C1 Not Monitor [20,28] [31,63]
Monitor [50,50] [41,51]
FIGURE 3.2: PAYOFFS IN COMBINED MODEL:
THE UNSECURED CASE, HIGH-RISK DEBTOR,
No MONITORING EXPECTED
This subgame, too, is dominance solvable, but the result is
that both creditors will monitor. This is not an equilibrium result
in the game as a whole, since neither creditor earns the competitive
rate of return (C1 earns less and C2 more); furthermore, the
debtor, while needing one creditor to monitor, needs only that one.
If each of the creditors instead assumes that they both will
monitor the debtor's behavior in the subgame, we get the following
payoff matrix:
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C2
Not Monitor Monitor
Not Monitor [23,26] [38,65]
Monitor [64,44] [50,50]
FIGURE 3.3: PAYOFFS IN COMBINED MODEL:
THE UNSECURED CASE, HIGH-RISK DEBTOR,
MONITORING EXPECTED
This is dominance solvable, with both creditors monitoring and
earning competitive returns, but with the debtor needlessly lower-
ing the value of equity as it bears the costs of two monitors.
Suppose instead that C1 receives a security interest. If the
creditors set their first-stage fee schedules on the assumption that
C1 monitors and C2 does not, we get the following payoff matrix:
C2
Not Monitor Monitor
C1 Not Monitor [41,7] [50,45]
Monitor [50,50] [50,42]
FIGURE 3.4: PAYOFFS IN COMBINED MODEL:
THE SECURED CASE
This is dominance solvable, with C1 monitoring and C2 not
monitoring. Each creditor earns a competitive rate of return, and
the value of the equity is maximized, given the constraints.
A clear result emerges. High-risk debtors should issue secured
credit to minimize common pool problems. Doing so reduces the
total monitoring costs if the cost of issuing secured credit is less
than the monitoring cost of the non-monitoring creditor. This
model predicts a pattern of low-risk debtors with unsecured credit,
and high-risk debtors with secured credit. The secured creditor
does the monitoring. This is the behavior pattern thought to be
present in most secured lending.67
Note, however, the limits of this model. The key condition
that gives rise to dominance solvability in the combined model is
that the secured creditor is assured of payment in full, even when
the debtor fails. The flipside of that result is that there must be
'7 But compare Adler, 21 J Legal Stud (cited in note 31) (arguing that unsecured credi-
tor monitoring is critical for policing conflicts between managers and dispersed
equityholders).
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some, perhaps vanishingly small, pool of unencumbered assets in
the firm when it fails. One might therefore argue that security in-
terests shrink the size of the common pool, but do not otherwise
eliminate the pool of assets available for unsecured creditors. Un-
derstanding that situation will require models with more than two
creditors. However, it still seems likely that the potential size of
the common pool will affect the monitoring decisions of the un-
secured creditors. Therefore, the importance of security interests
in mitigating the harms of the common pool will still hold.
CONCLUSION
During the 1980s, two separate strands of academic work in
commercial law attempted to explain the pervasive existence of se-
cured credit and to provide a theoretical basis for the bankruptcy
laws. This work tried to explain secured credit by focusing nar-
rowly on the problem of the misbehaving debtor. At the same time,
bankruptcy law scholarship was premised on the idea that bank-
ruptcy law solved a common pool problem. The common pool
problem arises from an overlapping distribution of rights among
the unsecured creditors of the failing firm. No creditor has the
right to exclude another, and therefore the dominant strategy for
each creditor may be to monitor the debtor in an attempt to defeat
the pro rata distribution scheme of bankruptcy. The possible rela-
tionship between security interests and common pools was ignored.
.This Article presents an integrated treatment of these issues
in a standard game-theoretic context. The monitoring of debtor
misbehavior takes the form of the Battle of the Sexes game, except
that the players seek to coordinate on playing different strategies
rather than the same strategy. Because of the multiplicity of Nash
equilibria, there can be no assurance that the creditors will appro-
priately coordinate their decisions. I suggest that eliminating mul-
tiple equilibria is a critical component of capital structure design.
In the simple debtor-misbehavior model, this amounts to no more
than providing for payments that are contingent upon the amount
of monitoring performed. Responding to the problem of creditor
misbehavior requires a different approach. Creditor misbehavior
can take the form of the Prisoner's Dilemma. Unlike the Battle of
the Sexes and its multiple equilibria, here a unique solution exists.
The difficulty is that it is a poor solution. Capital structure design
is needed to reach a different solution and security interests can
serve as the mechanism for reaching the superior solution.
Consequently, security interests do play an important role in
the efficient allocation of capital; most of their benefits derive from
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eliminating the duplicative monitoring of possible creditor misbe-
havior that defines the common pool. Moreover, we must recon-
sider the common pool construct that currently forms the basis for
our understanding of the bankruptcy laws. The existence or nonex-
istence of the unsecured common pool at the end of the firm's life
depends on the design of the firm's capital structure at its incep-
tion. The common pool need not arise, and we must therefore re-
consider the mission of the bankruptcy laws since the parties
themselves can and do keep this problem from arising in the first
place.
There may also be a broader principle at work. I started by
noting the analogy between the failing firm and the Prisoner's Di-
lemma. I have argued that one way out of the dilemma is to embed
it into a larger decisionmaking problem. The particular payoffs in
the new subgame-the old, free-standing Prisoner's Di-
lemma-emerge as results of the decisions in the larger game. The
resulting payoffs should not have the structure that leads to the
devastating results of the original Prisoner's Dilemma. Recognizing
that a small game is embedded in a larger game may have substan-
tial implications for legal analysis more generally. It may be insuf-
ficient simply to recognize a Prisoner's Dilemma or some other
game with multiple or suboptimal equilibria. Knowing when the
dilemma stands alone and when it does not becomes critical if we
are to use game-theoretic models to decide, as we have with regard
to the Bankruptcy Code, what problems the legal system should
address.
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